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When Do Analysts Add Value? 
Evidence from Corporate Spinoffs 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the information content and forecast accuracy of 1,793 analyst reports written 
around 62 spinoffs––a setting in which analysts’ ability to inform investors is potentially very 
high. We find that analysts pay little attention to subsidiaries about to be spun off even though 
these subsidiaries constitute a significant part of the parent company operations. Moreover, while 
the level of detail in analyst research about parent companies is significantly related to EPS and 
price forecast accuracy, the same is not true for the subsidiaries. We establish that this “forgotten 
child” phenomenon is linked to a “neglected parent” effect, whereby inaccuracy in subsidiary 
earnings forecasts is associated with inaccuracy in parent estimates. We conclude by showing 
that spinoffs may be a particularly complex setting for analysts to evaluate relative to other forms 
of corporate restructuring, such as IPOs, mergers, or bankruptcies, providing one potential 
explanation for our findings. 
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The impact of financial analysts on capital market efficiency has been much debated in 
academia and in practice. A large body of academic research finds that analysts act as important 
information intermediaries, generating financial forecasts, stock recommendations and other 
fundamental research which helps investors form more precise estimates of stock prices, thereby 
contributing to the overall efficiency of capital markets (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; Francis 
and Soffer, 1997; Hong et al., 2000; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Kelly and 
Ljungqvist, 2008). Other research, however, has identified situations and contexts in which the 
value of analyst coverage may be relatively more limited, such as when analysts face possible 
conflicts of interest (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ljungqvist et al., 
2006; Agrawal and Chen, 2008; Kolasinki and Kothari, 2008), or when the company or situation 
they are presented with is especially complex (Haw et al., 1994; Gilson, 2000) or not well-
matched to their area of expertise (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001; 
Clement et al., 2007). Still other research suggests that the informativeness of analyst 
recommendations, and the depth of analyst coverage, may have been adversely affected by 
certain regulatory changes. These include the adoption, in 2000, of Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(FD), which limited companies’ ability to selectively disclose information to analysts and 
investors (Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Agrawal et al., 2006; Gomes et al., 2007), and the 2003 
Global Settlement between ten leading investment banks and Federal and State regulators, which 
enforced greater separation between the banks’ research and investment banking activities 
(Kadan et al., 2009). 
In this paper, we examine how much value analysts create as information intermediaries 
in a setting in which their ability to inform investors is potentially very high: corporate spinoffs. 
When a firm spins off a subsidiary or division, each current outstanding share is in effect 
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converted into two new shares, representing separate claims on the stand-alone operations of the 
parent and newly-independent subsidiary. Prior to the effective date of the spinoff, therefore, 
actual or potential investors in the parent firm stock will benefit from any useful information that 
analysts can provide them about how the spinoff will impact value and the future financial 
performance of both the parent and the subsidiary.  
The potential for analysts to add value in this situation is especially high because while 
the new entities created by the spinoff have no stock price history—similar to an IPO—analysts 
may have been following the businesses of the parent and subsidiary for an extended time, giving 
them a comparative advantage in forecasting both entities’ future financial performance.1
Humana Inc.’s spinoff of Galen Health Care provides a case in point. As the nation’s 
largest health care provider, the company was diversified into two distinct businesses: health 
plan management, and hospital ownership and operation. In the early 1990’s, Humana’s 
management began to question the wisdom of this integrated strategy and eventually announced 
that it would be spinning off its hospital business under the Galen name. In structuring the 
transaction, one critical issue that emerged was how to allocate debt and corporate overhead 
between the two entities. An unsophisticated investor might have followed a simple rule of 
allocating these shared resources in proportion to each business’ contribution to the integrated 
company’s total assets, sales or profits. In fact, such rules are even used by sophisticated 
 
Analysts’ knowledge about the company and their industry expertise should also give them a 
comparative advantage in forecasting how shared corporate assets, liabilities, and overhead 
expense will be allocated between the parent and subsidiary as part of the separation of the two 
entities (analogous to dividing up common property in a divorce).  
                                                 
1 In our sample, the time elapsed between the initial spinoff announcement and the effective date of the spinoff is as 
long as two years. 
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academic researchers in large sample empirical studies––e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
subsequent studies of the conglomerate discount––where a more detailed analysis of each 
company is impractical. In contrast, a better informed and more dedicated financial analyst 
hypothetically following Humana might realize that such a rule would have resulted in a 
nonsensical allocation of corporate overhead in this case, since the less asset-intensive 
business—health plans––was the one that made greater use of the company’s shared computer 
and data processing systems (Gilson, 1994). 
Various factors may offset the apparent advantages that analysts have in assessing the 
impact of a spinoff, however. Prior to the spinoff, the firm may have reported relatively limited 
segment data, or have been lax in allocating overhead to individual business segments. When the 
parent and subsidiary conduct business with one another, identifying the stand-alone profitability 
of each can be confounded by transfer pricing issues. Analysts typically specialize in following 
certain industries, so they may produce less accurate forecasts when the parent and subsidiary 
operate in different industries (Zuckerman, 1999; Gilson et al., 2001).2
                                                 
2 Zuckerman (1999) shows that conglomerates are discounted to the extent that they are not covered by the analysts 
who specialize in their industries. Gilson et al. (2001) further show that, when those conglomerates are broken up 
through spinoffs, equity carve-outs, or tracking stock offerings, there are significant forecast improvements resulting 
from the increased coverage (of the “pieces”) by industry-specialized analysts. 
 The spinoff may be 
motivated by changes in the firm’s industry or markets, which by themselves make it more 
difficult to forecast future financial performance. And, in the wake of Regulation FD and the 
Global Settlement, analysts may lack access to valuable information about the spinoff that they 
might previously have obtained from management or their firm’s investment banking division. 
Whether analysts are able to provide investors with useful information in a situation where such 
information is particularly valuable is, therefore, an empirical question. 
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This paper provides empirical evidence on the quantity and quality of analysts’ research 
for a large sample of pending equity spinoffs and tracking stock offerings. Our sample includes 
62 firms that announced a spinoff or the creation of a tracking stock between 1985 and 2000. We 
focus on transactions that were announced before October 2000, thereby excluding the impact of 
Regulation FD and the Global Settlement, so that we can conduct a more powerful test of 
analysts’ ability to produce valuable information for investors. This type of analyst research and 
its outcome (separate price and earnings forecasts for parent and subsidiary) can only be 
observed in the actual analyst reports, not in any electronic database like I/B/E/S or Zacks. 
Therefore, we manually collected information from 1,793 analyst reports issued for our sample 
firms. 
An important contribution of this paper is that it is one of the first to provide very fine-
grained detail on the quantity and types of analyses included in analyst reports, a feature it shares 
with only three other papers: Gilson’s (2000) clinical study of the United Airlines employee 
buyout, and the large-sample studies of Asquith et al. (2005) and Houston et al. (2006). The most 
striking result that emerges from our descriptive analysis is what we refer to as the “forgotten 
child” effect. Namely, in their reports about companies that have announced a spinoff, analysts 
provide less information about subsidiaries that are to be spun off and make much less accurate 
earnings forecasts for them than they do for the parent companies, even though these subsidiaries 
represent a significant fraction of the combined entities’ assets and sales (about 45% and 20%, 
respectively). The relative lack of attention given to subsidiaries in analysts’ published research 
is remarkable, since any forecast of the parent’s future performance must account for the loss of 
the subsidiary’s business, so analysts must necessarily analyze the financial performance of both 
the parent and the subsidiary. 
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To better understand what is driving the results of our descriptive analysis, we use single- 
and two-stage regression models to examine the relation between the information content of 
analyst reports and the accuracy of their earnings and price forecasts about both the parent and 
subsidiary companies. We find that the accuracy of parent EPS forecasts is quite significantly 
related to a number of variables representing the information reported by analysts, including the 
number of annual earnings forecasts and the number of financial statements provided about the 
parent company. These EPS forecasts are also associated with several other relevant factors, such 
as the industrial relatedness of the parent and subsidiary firms, and the industry expertise of the 
analyst or the brokerage firm. In contrast to the parent company results, very few factors seem to 
influence the accuracy of subsidiary EPS forecasts, even after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity and for possible selection bias. Moreover, there are few factors associated with 
price forecast accuracy, particularly for subsidiaries, perhaps reflecting the fact that is very 
difficult for anyone, analysts included, to make accurate stock price forecasts. 
In light of these findings, we then consider whether analysts’ tendency to “forget the 
child,” the spun-off subsidiary, in turn leads them to “neglect the parent” by making less accurate 
forecasts about it. We investigate this question by considering the extent to which subsidiary 
forecast errors are associated with parent forecast errors. We find that when analysts make less-
accurate earnings forecasts about the subsidiary, they also make less accurate forecasts about the 
parent company, providing support for the “forgotten child, neglected parent” hypothesis.  
One potential explanation for our results is that the task of forecasting earnings and stock 
prices at the time of an impending spinoff may be particularly complex, perhaps even more so 
than it is in other “special situations” such as IPOs, mergers, bankruptcies, and other forms of 
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corporate restructuring. A comparison of the accuracy of analysts’ price and earnings forecasts to 
those reported in studies of other such special situations provides support for this explanation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and 
sample for our study. Section 2 presents the results of our descriptive analysis of the quantity and 
type of information provided by analysts in anticipation of corporate spinoffs. Sections 3 and 4 
analyze the quality of that information to the extent that it influences the accuracy of earnings 
and price forecasts, respectively. Section 5 compares the accuracy of analyst forecasts in our 
sample of spinoffs with what other studies have reported for other types of complex transactions. 
Section 6 concludes. 
1. Data and Sample 
Our sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the 
subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock 
issues) which were announced between 1985 and 2000. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to 
all of these transactions as “spinoffs” indistinctively. 
The dataset was constructed as follows. First, an initial sample of spinoffs (and tracking 
stock issues) was retrieved from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. Specifically, a search for all divestitures of U.S. targets (i.e., subsidiaries) 
to the parent company shareholders announced after January 1, 1985 and effective before 
December 31, 2001 yielded 943 transactions. From these, we eliminated 351 transactions that 
were announced but never completed; 144 transactions in which the subsidiary’s stock was 
already trading in the market separately before the spinoff because of an earlier equity carve out 
(e.g. Agilent from Hewlett-Packard, or Lucent from AT&T); and 98 duplicate observations 
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(deals that were listed more than once in SDC). These eliminations resulted in a sample of 350 
spinoffs.  
Second, we used Compustat to obtain financial data for the parent and subsidiary 
companies in the effective years of each of these 350 spinoffs. Data on sales, assets, and market 
value for both the parent and subsidiary companies were available for 267 of these spinoffs.3 
This number, as well as the other numbers of observations or transactions reported so far, refers 
to the number of new companies that were spun off. Because some transactions involve the 
simultaneous spinoff of more than one subsidiary by the parent (e.g. Dun & Bradstreet’s double 
divestiture of A.C. Nielsen and Cognizant), the actual number of deals is lower (254).4, 5
Out of the 254 deals, we randomly selected 66 as our final sample for analysis, in which 
four deals were double divestitures and one deal was a triple divestiture. For each of these 66 
deals, we retrieved from Investext all analyst reports that were issued about the parent, the 
subsidiary, or both, during the time period ranging from one month prior to the announcement 
date to one month after the effective date. When a deal was a multiple divestiture, we selected all 
reports issued about the parent or any of the subsidiaries during the time period ranging from one 
month prior to the earliest announcement date to one month after the latest effective date. This 
process yielded a sample of 2,512 reports. 
  
                                                 
3 In addition to SDC and Compustat CUSIPs and company names, we used information from the Center for 
Research on Security Prices (CRSP)-Compustat Header File, the CCH Capital Changes Reporter, and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) website (which lists all former names for any given company), to maximize the 
number of merged SDC-Compustat observations. Whenever data were not available for the exact year of the 
spinoff’s effective date, we used data from the latest year in which the parent company’s old stock was listed in 
Compustat, and/or from the first year in which the spun-off company started being included in Compustat (as far as 
two years before or after the spinoff became effective). 
4 We define two or more spinoffs by the same parent as a multiple divestiture when either the announcement or the 
effective date was within less than a week of each other. Choosing a different threshold, e.g. a month, or five days, 
instead of a week, does not make a difference. 
5 The 267-spinoff sample included 14 such multiple divestitures––nine double divestitures and two triple 
divestitures for which all spun-off companies are included in the sample, plus three additional double divestitures for 
which one of the spun-off companies had already been eliminated at the prior stage because of an earlier carve-out.  
8 
 
Of these 2,512 analyst reports, we subsequently eliminated those that were issued prior to 
the spinoff announcement date, when analysts may not have been aware that it was coming, or 
after the effective date, when the spun-off entity began trading as an independent company (and 
analysts therefore had actual stock prices to guide their analysis, which our research design seeks 
to avoid). Within the remaining 1,932 reports, 139 more were identified as duplicate reports and 
removed, leaving a final sample of 1,793 reports, or an average of 28.9 reports per spinoff. These 
eliminations resulted in the removal of four more deals from the sample, as all the reports on the 
parties to these transactions were written either before the announcement date or after the 
effective date. Thus, the 1,793 reports analyzed in this paper cover 62 transactions in total, 
representing 52 parent companies due to multiple spinoff transactions.6 Two of the parent 
companies, Premark International and Promus Cos., were themselves spun off from other 
companies earlier in our sample period.7
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the financial characteristics of the 52 parent 
companies analyzed in this paper, alongside data on the 62 subsidiaries which these firms spun 
off. All statistics in this table are measured as of the end of the fiscal year in which each spinoff 
became effective. Not surprisingly, the parent companies are significantly larger than the 
subsidiaries they spun off in terms of sales, total assets, and market value. However, the 
subsidiaries are not particularly small: their mean (median) sales are $2.2 billion ($1.2 billion)––
about one fifth (one third) of the parent company sales. Parent companies do not appear to have 
 Table 1 lists the spinoffs included in the sample, their 
announcement and effective dates, and the number of analyst reports pertaining to each spinoff. 
                                                 
6 All of the results that follow in this paper are identical if we eliminate the multiple-spinoff transactions and/or the 
tracking stock issues from our sample. 
7 In 1986, Kraft spun off Premark International, which ten years later spun off Tupperware. In 1990, Holiday Corp. 
spun off Promus Cos., which in turn spun off Promus Hotels Corp. in 1995. 
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significantly higher leverage, profit margins, or capital expenditures than the spun-off 
subsidiaries.  
The third and most distinctive step in our data collection process consisted of reading the 
1,793 analyst reports in their entirety (10,160 pages altogether) and manually coding their 
content. Specifically, we gathered data about both parents and subsidiaries on the types of 
financial analyses conducted and valuation methods employed, the earnings and price forecasts 
made, the amount of detailed analysis performed about each spinoff, and analyst sentiment about 
the parent company’s stock and about the spinoff itself. Given the magnitude of this task, we 
hired and trained a team of advanced undergraduate students with financial knowledge or 
experience to gather these data. Several steps were taken to ensure the reliability of the data they 
collected. First, to verify the quality of their work, the reports pertaining to several spinoffs were 
assigned to more than one student (unbeknownst to them), so that each student’s work was cross-
checked by at least one other student. When discrepancies were found, we personally checked 
the original analyst reports to ascertain which student was mistaken and instructed him or her to 
correct the mistakes in that and any other reports he or she had coded. Second, to ensure 
consistency across students in the way the more subjective information was coded, we had a 
different student go over the coding of the qualitative items across all reports.8
As a final step in our data collection process, we collected data about the analysts in our 
sample and the investment banks or research firms they were working for at the time they issued 
each report. The sources of these data included Thomson’s I/B/E/S; Institutional Investor 
 Third, we had 
three other students, including a graduate student, go over the entire data set and recode some of 
the quantitative items whenever serious errors, omissions, or inconsistencies became apparent. 
                                                 
8 As a further check on the validity of this data, we ran t-tests comparing the mean values of the variables coded by 
each pair of students, and these differences were rarely statistically significant, suggesting that inter-rater reliability 
was high. 
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magazine; the IPO underwriter reputation rankings developed by Carter and Manaster (1990), 
Carter et al. (1998), and Loughran and Ritter (2004), which are available from Jay Ritter’s 
website;9
2. Information Content of Analyst Reports about Upcoming Spinoffs 
 Ljungqvist et al.’s (2006) graphical timeline of major investment bank mergers 
between 1988 and 2002; and an updated version of their chart which was published in the New 
York Times on September 28, 2008. 
Table 3 presents summary data on the different types of analyses conducted, 
methodologies employed, and sentiments expressed by the analysts who wrote the reports in our 
sample. These summary statistics are disaggregated according to whether an analyst provided the 
relevant information about the parent company, its subsidiary, or the transaction itself.  
The information provided by analysts about subsidiaries is typically much sparser than 
the information provided about the parents, suggesting that these subsidiaries are the “forgotten 
child” in analysts’ research. For example, the average report in our sample is 5.7 pages long, of 
which 3.3 pages are devoted to analyzing the parent company and less than one (0.9 pages) to 
analyzing its subsidiary.10
                                                 
9 
 Consistent with this pattern, over 80% of all reports include an 
earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast for the parent, whereas over 80% of all reports include no EPS 
forecast for the subsidiary.  Similarly, nearly half of the reports provide an EPS growth forecast 
and over three quarters provide a forecast of the price-to-earnings (PE) ratio for the parent, 
compared to about three percent of reports providing an EPS growth forecast and eight percent 
providing a PE forecast for the subsidiary.  Finally, analysts appear to be much more likely to 
make other profit forecasts (such as EBITDA or net income) and financial statement for the 
parents than they are for the subsidiaries.  In contrast to these patterns, however, analysts are 
http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.pdf 
10 The remaining pages typically contain information about other subsidiaries in the parent company, as well as non-
substantive information such as legal disclaimers. 
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approximately equally likely to forecast stock prices and market capitalizations for the parents11
In addition to parent- and subsidiary-specific information, reports sometimes included 
analyses of and sentiments expressed about the upcoming spinoff transactions. We specifically 
gathered data on whether each report included a discussion of six characteristics pertaining to the 
spinoffs: 32.9% of reports provided an analysis of the firms’ competitors; 35.4% included 
financial information on the parent firm’s business segments; 26.4% discussed the rationale for 
the spinoff; 13.2% mentioned the notion of a conglomerate discount; 13.8% ventured forecasts 
of how debt or overhead costs would be allocated in the spinoff process; and 8.4% discussed the 
spinoff’s transaction costs.  
 
as they are for the subsidiaries, and in terms of valuation methods, analysts are most likely to use 
a PE multiple of comparable companies to value subsidiaries, just as they do for the parents. 
Many prior studies have documented the near-absence of “sell” recommendations in 
analyst reports (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 1998; Barber et al., 2001; Morgan and Stocken 2003; 
Cowen et al., 2006; or Houston et al., 2006). Consistent with their findings, most of the reports in 
our sample expressed a favorable, or at worst, neutral opinion about the parent’s stock (62% and 
25%, respectively); not even 1% of reports made negative recommendations. This result is 
perhaps not surprising, if managers undertake spinoffs because they expect them to create value 
(Schipper and Smith, 1983; Hite and Owers, 1983; D’Souza and Jacob, 2000).  More unique to 
this paper is the finding of a slightly higher dispersion in analyst sentiment about the spinoff 
transactions themselves: just over a third of reports expressed a positive opinion about the 
transactions and nearly half were neutral about them, though once again, only 1% of reports 
expressed a negative opinion about the spinoffs.  
                                                 
11 Specifically, 32.7% of reports provide either a stock price forecast and/or a market capitalization forecast. Of 
these, 28.6% provide only a stock price forecast, 0.8% provide only a market capitalization forecast (from which it 
is possible to derive a price forecast), and 3.3% provide both types of forecast.  
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Our findings about the information content of analyst reports are overall consistent with 
those reported by Asquith et al. (2005) and Houston et al. (2006). Both studies found, as does 
ours, that PE multiples are the most commonly used valuation method, followed by enterprise 
value multiples of sales and EBITDA, and lastly by DCF. Asquith et al. also report, as do we, 
that income statements are the financial statements most commonly forecasted by analysts. 
However, there are some differences between our findings in terms of the frequency with which 
similar items are reported, as can be reasonably expected from the differences in our sample 
selection processes. For instance, Houston et al. find price targets in 79% of reports for their 
sample of IPO firms during the hot market period of 1996–2000. Almost all reports in Asquith et 
al.’s sample contain earnings forecasts and about three-quarters contain price targets (as 
compared to the respective figures of 80% and 33%, in our sample).12
What is more remarkable is how little attention analysts pay in their reports to the 
subsidiaries to be spun off, despite the fact that these subsidiaries are reasonably-sized entities in 
and of themselves. Even if analysts were not interested in covering the subsidiaries once they 
began trading as independent companies because of their size, industry, or some other reason, the 
fact that these analysts are covering the parent companies would lead one to expect greater 
analysis of the subsidiaries, in that their spinoffs are bound to change the parent companies’ 
 Yet, only 10% of Asquith 
et al.’s sample reports contain segment financial information, as compared to 35.4% in our 
sample. This higher frequency can be expected since our sample companies are, by definition, 
conglomerates about to spin off one or more of their businesses. 
                                                 
12 Asquith et al. (2005) selected a sample of reports written by Institutional Investor’s All-American Research Team, 
which have been found to be the best in their industry both by the institutional investors who rated them and by the 
academic researchers who have analyzed the accuracy of their forecasts e.g., Stickel (1992). This sample selection 
criterion is also likely to lead to the inclusion of relatively large companies in the sample––an additional reason why 
we expect to find less information in our sample reports. Indeed, Asquith et al. report an average market value of 
equity of $16 billion for their sample firms; the comparable figure for our sample (as can be inferred from Table 2) 
is $12 billion.  
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futures significantly. Our finding that this is not the case therefore implies that, by forgetting 
about the “child”, analysts are somehow neglecting the parent as well. 
3. Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings and Price Forecasts around Spinoffs 
We proceed to examine how accurate analysts are at forecasting the earnings and stock 
prices of both parent and subsidiary companies in anticipation of spinoffs. Two earlier studies 
have looked at analysts’ forecasting abilities around these types of deals: Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) and Gilson et al. (2001). Our detailed database of actual analyst reports 
allows us to extend their analysis in two ways: by looking at analyst forecasts for the subsidiary 
as well as for the parent, and by looking at price forecasts in addition to earnings forecasts. 
3.1. Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
Following these and most other studies of analyst earnings forecast accuracy (e.g. 
Thomas, 2002; Agrawal et al., 2006), we measure EPS Forecast Error as the absolute value of 
the difference between the EPS forecasted for the subsequent year and actual EPS on the forecast 
date, scaled by the company’s stock price. Like Gilson et al. (2001) and Agrawal et al. (2006), 
we measure the parent company’s stock price at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast 
period for our Parent EPS Forecast Error variable. For the Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error 
variable, since there is no stock price available in the year prior to the forecast, we measure the 
subsidiary stock price at the end of the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. We further 
follow Agrawal et al. (2006) in eliminating outliers in which the relevant stock price used to 
construct this variable is less than $1, and those for which EPS Forecast Error is greater than or 
equal to two. Higher values of EPS Forecast Error thus indicate that a forecast is less accurate 
(as the difference between the actual and forecasted values is greater), and vice versa.  
14 
 
The first row in Panel A of Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for EPS Forecast Error. 
The mean (median) EPS Forecast Error for parent companies is 5.6% (1.3%). These numbers are 
in line with those found by prior researchers studying spinoffs, especially Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999), who report pre-spinoff mean (median) earnings forecast errors of 4.3% 
(1.1%). Gilson et al. (2001) report mean errors of 2.82% for the last fiscal year before the 
spinoffs in their sample.13 By contrast, analysts tend to produce less accurate forecasts of post-
spinoff EPS for subsidiaries: the mean (median) EPS Forecast Error for subsidiaries is 7.5% 
(3.3%). No other study has analyzed forecast errors for subsidiaries in spinoffs.14
3.2. Price Forecast Accuracy 
 These 
univariate differences in mean (median) EPS Forecast Errors between the parent companies and 
their subsidiaries are statistically significant: the t-statistic (z-statistic) is 1.73 (3.24). 
For symmetry with our analysis of earnings forecast accuracy, our primary measure of 
Price Forecast Error is constructed as the absolute value of the forecasted (target) stock price 
less the actual stock price on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price on the 
forecast date. As with EPS Forecast Error, higher values of Price Forecast Error indicate that 
analysts were less accurate in their price forecasts, and vice versa. As before, we construct this 
variable for all price forecasts made about parent companies (Parent Price Forecast Error) and 
their spun-off subsidiaries (Subsidiary Price Forecast Error).  
                                                 
13 By construction, the forecasts in our sample were all issued before the spinoff, even though the date for which the 
analysts were forecasting may have been after the spinoff became effective. 
14 However, our findings are consistent with Thomas (2002), who reports mean forecast errors of 3.7% for 
conglomerate firms and larger errors for a matched control group of single-segment firms. Although this result 
seems hard to reconcile with Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Gilson et al.’s (2001) finding that 
earnings forecast accuracy improves significantly after conglomerate stock breakups, the explanation offered by 
Thomas is that even if analysts’ forecast errors are larger for conglomerates than they are for focused firms, so long 
as those errors are imperfectly correlated, the consolidated forecast may in fact be more accurate than the forecast 
for a focused firm. This “information diversification” hypothesis may also be at play in our context. 
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The first row in Panel B of Table 4 shows that the mean (median) Parent Price Forecast 
Error is 44% (21%) and the mean (median) Subsidiary Price Forecast Error is 48% (26%), each 
many times larger than the EPS forecast errors reported in Panel A. Predictably, the difference in 
the mean Parent Price Forecast Error is not statistically different from the mean Subsidiary 
Price Forecast Error (the t-statistic is -0.82), and the difference in medians is not statistically 
significantly different from zero either (the z-statistic is -0.44).  
In sum, the significant differences between the accuracy of the earnings forecasts analysts 
make for the parent and subsidiary companies is consistent with the notion, suggested by our 
earlier findings in the paper, that spun-off subsidiaries are the “forgotten child” of analyst 
research. The lack of significant differences between parent and subsidiary price forecast errors 
is not surprising, however, given that stock prices are inherently more difficult to forecast than 
accounting performance.  
4. Impact of the Information Content of Analyst Reports on Forecast Accuracy 
In this section of the paper, we extend our analyses from the previous two sections by 
examining the relationship between the amount and type of research performed by analysts about 
upcoming spinoffs and their performance in forecasting earnings and stock prices. 
4.1. Variable Descriptions 
The dependent variables in these regressions are EPS Forecast Error and Price Forecast 
Error, for the parent and subsidiary companies. The independent variables we include can be 
broken down into five categories, discussed below, and summary statistics appear in Table 5. 
The first set of variables measures the amount of attention analysts devote to companies 
in their reports. Total Report Pages is the total number of pages included in the report and Share 
of Report Pages is the proportion of pages in the report devoted to analyzing either the parent or 
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subsidiary. Price Forecast is an indicator variable which takes the value one if an analyst 
forecasts a company’s stock price. Number of Annual EPS Forecasts is a count of the number of 
years for which an analyst forecasts annual earnings-per-share for a company, and EPS Growth 
Forecast is an indicator variable taking the value one if an analyst forecasts growth in a 
company’s EPS. Similarly, PE Forecast is an indicator variable which takes the value one if an 
analyst forecasts a company’s P/E ratio, and Other Forecast is an indicator variable taking the 
value one if an analyst forecasts another accounting item or valuation ratio, e.g., revenues. 
Finally, Financial Statement Index is a count of the number of pro-forma financial statements––
balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement––included in the report. We predict 
that these variables will all be negatively associated with EPS Forecast Error, as analysts should 
make more accurate forecasts the more detail they include about a company in their reports. 
The second category contains two variables representing the analysis performed about the 
spinoff transaction itself.  Spinoff Analysis Index is a count of how many of the following six 
analyses analysts include in their reports: competitor analysis, segment-level financial 
information, rationale for the spinoff, analysis of the conglomerate discount, allocation of debt or 
overhead costs, and transaction costs associated with the spinoff.  Days from Announcement to 
Report Date is defined as the number of days that have elapsed from the announcement of a 
spinoff to the date on which a report was written. Both of these variables should be negatively 
associated with EPS Forecast Error, as analysts can be expected to make more accurate 
forecasts when they devote more effort to analyzing an upcoming transaction.  
The third category contains three control variables representing company-specific 
characteristics: Ln(Total Assets); Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent; and 
Relatedness, an indicator variable taking the value one if the parent company and its spun-off 
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subsidiary share a four-digit SIC code. We expect the first two of these variables to be positively 
associated with EPS Forecast Error, since analysts are likely to make less accurate earnings 
forecasts about large firms and about companies undertaking complex transactions. However, 
Relatedness can be expected to be negatively correlated with forecast accuracy, as analysts are 
likely to make more accurate forecasts when they are evaluating related businesses. 
The fourth category represents the characteristics of the analysts and brokerage firms 
issuing the reports in our sample. Analyst Ranking by Institutional Investor (II) is a categorical 
variable taking the value one if an analyst is a runner-up, two if the analyst is ranked third, three 
if the analyst is ranked second, and four if the analyst is ranked first by Institutional Investor.15
To help resolve this ambiguity, we include two other variables measuring the experience 
analysts and brokerages have accumulated in analyzing particular industrial sectors. Analyst 
Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector is an indicator variable which takes the value one 
if an analyst writes 10% or more of the reports issued by his brokerage firm about firms 
operating in a given industrial sector.
 
Similarly, Broker Reputation Ranking is the underwriter reputation ranking developed by and 
analyzed in Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter et al. (1998), and Loughran and Ritter (2004). If 
these variables measure analyst and brokerage expertise, then they should be negatively 
associated with EPS Forecast Error; however, if they reflect something other than expertise, 
such as overconfidence, these variables could be positively associated with EPS Forecast Error. 
16
                                                 
15 Analyst Ranking by II is derived from Institutional Investor Magazine, which ranks the top three analysts in 
several sectors, along with the runners-up, reflecting analysts’ reputations in the investment community (Leone and 
Wu, 2007; Groysberg et al., 2008). 
 Analogously, Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector 
is an indicator variable taking the value one if a brokerage firm issues 2% or more of the reports 
16 I/B/E/S uses its own classification scheme, generally based on the Morgan Stanley Capital International Industry 
Classifications, to define the industrial sectors in which companies operate. In this system, the sector in which a firm 
operates is the broadest industrial definition, followed by the industry, and then the group. For example, Anheuser 
Busch operates in the Consumer Non-Durables sector, the Beverage industry, and the Breweries group, while Hilton 
Hotels operates in the Consumer Service sector, the Leisure industry, and the Hotels group.  
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in any given industrial sector.17
We also include Analyst Advisor, a count of the number of deals in the ten years 
preceding a spinoff in which the investment bank issuing the analyst report (or a predecessor 
bank that merged into it) participated as an advisor of some sort.
 In contrast to the ranking variables, these two variables reflect 
industrial expertise, so we expect them to be negatively correlated with EPS Forecast Error. 
18
Finally, the fifth category measures analyst sentiment about the upcoming spinoff. 
Optimistic Spinoff Spin is an indicator variable taking the value one if an analyst expressed a 
favorable opinion about a spinoff, suggesting that it should be negatively associated with EPS 
Forecast Error. Pessimistic Spinoff Spin is an indicator variable which takes the value one if an 
analyst expressed an unfavorable opinion about a spinoff, suggesting that it should be positively 
related to EPS Forecast Error.
 This variable is included to 
control for the effects on forecast accuracy of brokerage firms having a prior advisory 
relationship with companies. If such relationships represent accumulated expertise, then Analyst 
Advisor should be associated with improved forecast accuracy. However, if these relationships 
signify conflicts of interest, then Analyst Advisor should be linked to less accurate forecasts. 
19
4.2. Analyst Research and Earnings Forecast Accuracy  
  
Table 6 presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent 
variables are Parent EPS Forecast Error in Regression [1] and Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error 
in Regression [2]. The independent variables described in the previous subsections, as well as 
                                                 
17 The thresholds of 10% and 2% were chosen, respectively, to calculate Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s 
Reports in Sector and Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector because they were the median values in the 
distributions of these two variables. Our results are not sensitive to either of these two cutoffs. 
18 “Deals” include mergers and acquisitions, spinoffs, divestitures, and equity issues (both IPOs and SEOs). Data for 
this variable were gathered from Thomson One and Capital IQ. 
19 Both of these variables take the value zero if an analyst expressed a neutral or no opinion about a spinoff. 
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year fixed effects, are included in these models. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
analyst level to account for intra-group correlation among reports written by the same analyst. 
In Regression [1], the relations between Parent EPS Forecast Error and the independent 
variables are generally as predicted.  The coefficients on Fraction Parent Pages, Number of 
Annual Parent EPS Forecasts, and Other Parent Forecast are all negative and significant, 
suggesting that when analysts devote more attention to parent companies, they make more 
accurate forecasts about them. The coefficient on Parent Financial Statement Index is positive 
and significant, suggesting that the more financial statements analysts project, the less accurate 
their forecasts.20
The coefficients on the two “ranking” variables, Analyst Ranking by II and Broker 
Reputation Ranking, are both positive and significant. Consistent with the earlier discussion, the 
signs of these coefficients suggest that these ranking schemes may reflect something other than 
analyst or brokerage firm expertise. By contrast, the coefficients on Analyst Provides 10%+ of 
Broker’s Reports in Sector and Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector are both negative and 
 Days from Announcement to Report Date is negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that analysts make more accurate forecasts the greater the amount of time 
elapsed between the announcement and report dates. Ln(Total Assets of Parent) and Total Assets 
of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent are positive and statistically significant, meaning that 
analysts make less accurate forecasts about larger firms and firms involved in more complex 
transactions. By contrast, the coefficient on Relatedness is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that analysts make more accurate forecasts about a parent company when it is related 
to the segment it is about to spin off. 
                                                 
20 While this result may seem counterintuitive at first, it is likely to be attributable to some omitted variable that is 
positively associated both with forecast errors and with analysts’ propensity to forecast financial statements, such as 
the noisiness of the environment. Consistent with this explanation, DeFond et al. (2003) find that analysts are more 
likely to forecast cash flows for firms that have high earnings volatility. 
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statistically significant, meaning that industry experience is indeed linked to improved forecast 
accuracy. Additionally, the coefficient on Analyst Advisor is negative and significant, indicating 
that prior advisory relationships are also correlated with improved forecast accuracy.  Finally, the 
coefficient on Optimistic Spinoff Spin is negative and significant, suggesting that analysts make 
more accurate forecasts about a company when they have expressed a favorable opinion about its 
spinoff. The coefficient on Pessimistic Spinoff Spin is positive, though it is not statistically 
significant.21
Regression [2], in which the dependent variable is Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error, tells a 
dramatically different story. The only significant variable representing the contents of the analyst 
report is Subsidiary Price Forecast, whose coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that 
analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts for subsidiaries when they include a price 
forecast in their analyses. Additionally, the coefficient on Days from Announcement to Report 
Date is negative and significant, again indicating that analysts make more accurate forecasts 
when more time elapses after the announcement date. The coefficient on Ln(Total Assets of 
Subsidiary) is again positive and significant, suggesting that analysts make less accurate earnings 
forecasts for larger subsidiaries. The coefficient on Broker Provides 2%+ Reports in Sector is 
positive and significant, suggesting that the industrial expertise of a brokerage is related to less 
accurate forecasts, potentially because this industry expertise is specialized to the parent, not the 
subsidiary.  Finally, the coefficient on Analyst Advisor is negative and significant, indicating that 
previous advisory relationships are again correlated with more accurate earnings forecasts.  
  
It is important to highlight two major differences between these subsidiary-level results 
and the parent company results. First, many fewer variables are significant in the subsidiary 
                                                 
21 We find similar results when we replace these two “spinoff spin” variables with analogous variables for analysts’ 
stock recommendations: positive recommendations are associated with more accurate forecasts, and negative 
recommendations with less accurate forecasts. 
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regression than were in the parent company regression. Second, and more strikingly, the 
significant variables in the subsidiary regression pertain to analyst and company characteristics, 
not to the contents of the reports. In the parent company regression, however, both types of 
variables are related to forecast accuracy. These two differences are consistent with our earlier 
depiction of subsidiaries as the “forgotten children” of companies covered in analyst reports.  
4.3. Controlling for Unobserved Heterogeneity and Selection Bias 
One potential concern with the foregoing results is that they do not fully account for the 
possibility that the observations are not truly independent of one another. While the standard 
errors in the regressions in the previous subsection are clustered at the analyst level, an additional 
way of accounting for this concern is to include analyst fixed effects and thus correct the 
estimates for unobserved heterogeneity.22
As before, Regression [1] in Table 7 takes Parent EPS Forecast Error as its dependent 
variable, while Regression [2] uses Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error. The number of significant 
coefficients falls in both regressions, suggesting that analyst fixed effects explain a portion of the 
variation. Nevertheless, many of the same variables in Regression [1], the parent firm regression, 
remain statistically significant. By contrast, none of the coefficients in Regression [2] is 
statistically significant, lending further support to our finding that subsidiaries appear to be the 
forgotten children of analyst reports. 
 Table 7 presents the fixed effects regression results. 
A second potential concern with the results presented in the preceding subsection is that 
they may be driven by the effects of selection: of the 1,793 reports comprising our sample, 1,400 
of them include EPS forecasts for the parent companies and only 263 of them provide such 
forecasts for the subsidiaries. As a result, the factors driving analysts to include EPS forecasts in 
                                                 
22 It would not be appropriate to include firm or deal fixed effects because they would entirely swamp the variation 
across analysts––the key unit of analysis in this work––as we are primarily interested in what analysts include in 
their models and how these items influence analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
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their reports may be correlated in unobserved ways with their ability, or lack thereof, to make 
accurate forecasts. Thus, it becomes desirable to rule out this possibility by using Heckman two-
stage models instead of ordinary least squares regressions. 
Heckman’s estimator requires an exclusion restriction, i.e., at least one (instrumental) 
variable that is correlated with analysts’ propensities to include EPS forecasts in their reports but 
not with the accuracy of those forecasts, and which should thus be included in the first-stage 
specification but rightfully excluded from the second. We propose and use as our instrument 
Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO, the ratio of the dollar value of IPO issues in the subsidiary’s 
industry to the dollar value of IPO issues in the parent’s industry, both measured in the year in 
which each analyst report was written.  
The logic behind this instrument is as follows. We expect Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO to 
be correlated with EPS Forecast, in that analysts should be more likely to include greater detail 
in their coverage of companies operating in “hot” industries (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Rajan 
and Servaes, 1997) More specifically, we predict a negative relation between this instrument and 
Parent EPS Forecast, because analysts will be more likely to include an EPS forecast about a 
parent company when it operates in a more active industry, represented by smaller values of 
Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO. Analogously, we expect a positive relation between the instrument 
and Subsidiary EPS Forecast, as analysts will be more likely to make EPS forecasts about 
subsidiaries operating in more active industries, as reflected by higher values of Subsidiary IPO / 
Parent IPO. In contrast to these hypothesized relationships, however, there is no direct 
mechanism that we are aware of that would systematically link the relative volume of new equity 
issues in particular industries to the accuracy of analyst’s EPS forecasts, so our instrument also 
satisfies the exclusion restriction. 
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Table 8 presents the results of the Heckman regressions. Regression [1] presents the 
results of a regression taking Parent EPS Forecast Error as the dependent variable in the 
second-stage model and Parent EPS Forecast as the dependent variable in the first-stage model. 
In Regression [2], Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error is the dependent variable in the second-stage 
model and Subsidiary EPS Forecast is the dependent variable in the first-stage model. In both 
regressions, Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO is the instrument included in the first-stage models. 
In both Regressions [1] and [2], the results of the second-stage models remain quite 
similar to the results of the ordinary least squares models. Importantly, Subsidiary IPO / Parent 
IPO behaves exactly as it was expected to, with a negative and highly significant coefficient in 
the first-stage model pertaining to Regression [1] and a positive and significant coefficient in the 
first-stage model pertaining to Regression [2]. All in all, the results in this table suggest that our 
earlier findings are not attributable to selection. 
4.4. Forgotten Children, Neglected Parents? 
Thus far, we have established that analysts provide little information in their reports 
about subsidiaries which will be spun off from their corporate parents, and this inattention affects 
the accuracy of their forecasts in at least two ways: first, analysts make less accurate earnings 
forecasts for the subsidiaries than for their parents, and second, the amount and type of analyst 
research is much less relevant to earnings forecast accuracy for the subsidiaries than it is for the 
parents.  
At a first glance, the fact that analysts pay less attention to the subsidiaries than to the 
parents themselves can hardly be seen as surprising, since analysts have a mandate to cover the 
parents. However, given the size and strategic significance of many of these subsidiaries, a 
thorough analysis of the parent’s future performance would seem to require greater attention to 
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the subsidiaries about to be spun off. In this subsection, we directly test whether analysts’ 
abilities to make accurate earnings forecasts about parent companies are hindered by their 
inattention to the subsidiaries. 
We explore this issue by including the Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error variable as an 
independent variable in the Parent EPS Forecast Error regression developed in the previous 
subsections. Because analysts only make EPS forecasts for subsidiaries in 263 of the 1,793 
reports (as compared to 1,400 reports including parent EPS forecasts), we again use a two-stage 
Heckman model to account for the effects of this selection process.  
In this specification, the first-stage regression predicts analysts’ propensity to make a 
subsidiary EPS forecast and therefore takes Subsidiary EPS Forecast as its dependent variable. 
The independent variables in that regression are the same as the variables used in the first-stage 
of the subsidiary Heckman model (Regression [2]) in Table 8, including the instrumental 
variable, Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO. The second-stage regression predicts parent earnings 
forecast accuracy, and therefore takes Parent EPS Forecast Error as its dependent variable. The 
key independent variable in this model is Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error, corrected for selection 
due to missing observations by the Heckman estimator. The other independent variables in this 
second-stage regression are the same as those included in the second-stage of the parent 
Heckman model (Regression [1]) in Table 8. 
We present the results of this two-stage model in Table 9. The variables in the first-stage 
model behave as they did previously, in particular the instrumental variable, Subsidiary IPO / 
Parent IPO, which remains positively and significantly related to Subsidiary EPS Forecast. 
More importantly, in the second-stage regression, the coefficient on Subsidiary EPS Forecast 
Error is positively and significantly associated with Parent EPS Forecast Error, meaning that 
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when analysts make less accurate forecasts about the subsidiaries that will be spun off, they also 
make less accurate forecasts about their parents. To rule out the possibility that our results are 
due to simple correlation between parent and subsidiary EPS forecast errors, we ran the opposite 
regression, including Parent EPS Forecast Error as an independent variable in a regression 
taking Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error as its dependent variable; in that model, the coefficient on 
Parent EPS Forecast Error is not statistically significant. Thus, our result provides support for 
the notion that by forgetting about subsidiaries, analysts also neglect the parents. 
4.5. Analyst Research and Price Forecast Accuracy  
We conclude this section of the paper by briefly turning our attention to the impact of 
analyst research on the accuracy of price forecasts for both parent and subsidiary companies. The 
dependent variable is now Price Forecast Error, which we calculate as before. Since higher 
values of Price Forecast Error reflect lower accuracy, a negative coefficient for an information 
item signifies that such information is associated with more accurate forecasts, and vice versa.  
Table 10 presents the results of regressions evaluating price forecast accuracy; 
Regression [1] takes Parent Price Forecast Error as its dependent variable and Regression [2] 
uses Subsidiary Price Forecast Error as its dependent variable. All of the independent variables 
are the same as the ones employed in the previous section of the paper, except for Price 
Forecast, which is now excluded. As we did previously, we include year fixed effects, as well as 
robust standard errors clustered at the analyst-level to account for intra-group correlation. 
In Regression [1], the coefficient on EPS Growth Forecast is negative and significant, 
indicating that when analysts include an EPS growth forecast in their reports, they tend to make 
more accurate price forecasts. The coefficient on Spinoff Analysis Index is positive and 
significant, suggesting that more detailed analyses of spinoff transactions are associated with less 
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accurate price forecasts. Finally, the coefficients on Ln(Total Parent Assets) and on Analyst 
Ranking by II are both negative and significant, in contrast to our findings in the EPS models.  
In Regression [2], the coefficients on Other Subsidiary Forecast and Days from 
Announcement to Report Date are both negative and statistically significant, indicating that when 
analysts include a profit forecast or have more time to evaluate an upcoming spinoff, they make 
more accurate price forecasts for the subsidiary. The coefficient on Subsidiary Financial 
Statement Index is positive and significant, meaning that analysts make less accurate price 
forecasts the greater the number of subsidiary financial statements they attempt to forecast.  
To analyze the sensitivity of our results about price forecast accuracy to the measures and 
statistical methods we use, we conduct two additional robustness checks. First, we replace Price 
Forecast Error with the measure of price forecast accuracy employed by Asquith et al. (2005), 
described in the second row of Panel B in Table 4. Second, just as we did in our analysis of 
earnings forecast errors, we employ analyst fixed effects and Heckman models (using Subsidiary 
IPO / Parent IPO as the instrument) instead of ordinary least squares regressions. In both cases, 
our results are qualitatively unchanged.  
Overall, many fewer coefficients are significant in the Price Forecast Error regressions 
than were in the EPS Forecast Error models, and once again, this is particularly true in the 
subsidiary regression. This finding seems to suggest that the types of projections analysts include 
in their reports are less helpful to them in making price forecasts than they are in making EPS 
forecasts, especially in the case of the subsidiaries. The result is also consistent with the fact that 
stock prices are inherently more difficult to predict than accounting earnings. 
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5. Comparing Spinoffs to Other Complex Transactions 
Thus far, we have established that analysts provide less information about subsidiaries 
that will be spun-off than they do about their parents, and this inattention is associated with less 
accurate earnings forecasts for the subsidiaries and in turn, for the parent companies. The 
outstanding question is why analysts do not seem to add more value in a context where their 
potential to do so seems large. One possible explanation is that spinoffs may be an especially 
difficult context for analysts to evaluate.  
We investigate this possibility by comparing the earnings forecast errors in our sample 
with those reported in studies of other complex situations. As discussed previously (and shown 
in Panel A of Table 4), the mean (median) EPS Forecast Error for the parent companies in our 
sample is 5.6% (1.3%), and for the subsidiaries, it is 7.5% (3.3%). Rajan and Servaes (1997) 
examine analyst EPS forecast errors for IPOs and find that the average errors range from 3.4% 
for a three-month window to 5.8% for a 12-month window after the IPO. Clement et al. (2007) 
study analyst forecasting performance within the context of firms that experience restructuring 
charges from downsizing (e.g., costs of closing plants, selling off assets, or terminating 
employees) and report mean earnings forecast errors of 5%. In these cases, the earnings forecast 
estimates in the context of our sample of spinoffs appear to be less accurate than those in the 
other complex situations, suggesting that the complexity of spinoffs relative to other types of 
restructuring may indeed be linked to analysts’ inattention to subsidiaries. 
This point is further corroborated by comparing forecast error estimates from studies of 
mergers to our sample of spinoffs. On the one hand, in principle, a merger (where one plus one 
equals two) is the reverse of a spinoff (where two minus one equals one), suggesting that 
analysts should have equal ease or difficulty in making accurate earnings forecast estimates for 
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the two types of transactions. On the other hand, because of the intricate links that may have 
developed over time across a firm’s different businesses, combined with the challenges of debt 
and overhead allocation among the parts of the former whole, spinoffs may turn out to be more 
complex to analyze than mergers. 
Haw et al. (1994) study the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts around mergers and 
find mean (median) absolute forecast errors relative to actual EPS (instead of relative to price) of 
19% (10%) in the year before the merger, and 29% (14%) in the year after the merger. However, 
the second row in Panel A of Table 4 shows that the mean (median) earnings forecast error 
(computed relative to actual EPS rather than to price), is 34.58% (11.30%) for the parent 
companies in our sample and 51.25% (44.44%) for the subsidiaries. Clearly, the forecast error 
estimates from our sample of spinoffs far exceed the forecast error estimates from Haw et al.’s 
sample of mergers, suggesting that spinoffs exhibit a greater degree of complexity than the 
reverse type of transaction.  
To substantiate our point still further, we also undertake comparisons of the price 
forecasts made in our sample of spinoffs to those made in the context of other complex 
transactions. To facilitate comparison with the few studies that have analyzed price forecast 
accuracy, we report in Panel B of Table 4 price forecast errors measured in two alternative ways.  
First, following Gilson et al. (2000), we measure price forecast errors as the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of the forecasted stock price to the actual stock price (Line 2 in Panel B of 
Table 4), and find mean (median) errors of 42.86% (23.50%) for the parent and 42.17% 
(31.60%) for the subsidiary. Gilson et al. (2000) compare the valuation of bankrupt firms that 
outside investors or researchers can perform using earnings forecasts published by management 
or financial analysts, with the actual market value of those firms. The mean (median) price 
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forecast errors they report are -0.5% (9.9%) using a discounted capital cash flow valuation 
model, and 3.6% (3.0%) using multiples of comparable companies.23
Second, following Asquith et al. (2005), we calculate the percentage of analyst reports 
whose price forecasts were attained or surpassed by the actual stock price at any time during the 
12-month period following the release of the report, and estimate the maximum (minimum) 
percentage of the price target attained by the actual stock price during those 12 months, when the 
price target was set above (below) the stock price on the report date (Line 3 in Panel B of Table 
4). We find that 66% (46%) of the reports that contained parent (subsidiary) price forecasts had 
those forecasts attained or surpassed by the actual stock price, which they did by an average of 
47% (28%). For the remaining 34% (54%) of reports whose forecasts were never met within 12 
months, the actual stock price fell short of attaining the forecast by an average of 20% (27%). In 
contrast, 54% of the reports in Asquith et al.’s (2005) sample saw their forecasts attained or 
surpassed, by an average of 37%, and in the remaining 46%, the actual price missed the target by 
an average of 16%. The larger margin of error we find in our sample is consistent with the fact 
that spinoffs are unusually complex situations, whereas the forecasts in Asquith et al. (2005) 
were made in the regular course of business for the firms in their sample. 
 Clearly, these figures fall 
far short of the estimates from our sample. 
Overall, our examination of analyst forecasting performance and the comparison with 
earlier results from a variety of different settings suggests that the challenge analysts face in 
forecasting earnings around spinoffs is larger than that encountered in other “special situations” 
                                                 
23 Kaplan and Ruback (1995) perform a similar comparison in the context of highly leveraged transactions and 
report similarly measured mean valuation errors that range between 0.3% and -17% depending on the valuation 
method used. However, their study relies only on management forecasts as published in legal filings, not on analyst 
forecasts, and is therefore less relevant here. Houston et al. (2006) run regressions of IPO actual offer price to sales 
ratios on price to sale ratios estimated using the same comparable companies used by analysts to set target prices 
when they initiate coverage of the IPO firm and find that the estimated values only explained about 30% of the 
variation in IPO offer prices in their sample. However, they do not report valuation errors, thus their results cannot 
be directly compared to ours. 
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such as IPOs, mergers, bankruptcies, and other forms of corporate restructuring. Forecasting 
stock prices for parent and subsidiary companies subsequent to a spinoff seems particularly 
difficult, perhaps because spinoffs are the only context in which there is absolutely no price 
history for the subsidiaries that need to be analyzed.24
6. Conclusion 
  
In this paper we investigate equity analysts’ coverage of pending corporate spinoffs, and 
analyze whether equity analysts provide investors with useful information about the valuation 
consequences of these transactions. Spinoffs provide an interesting context in which to study the 
information content of analysts’ research, because the degree of information asymmetry between 
corporate insiders and investors is especially high in these situations. Analysts who have 
followed these firms for an extended time prior to the completion of these spinoffs should have a 
comparative advantage in forecasting the future stand-alone performance of the parent and 
subsidiary companies, and in assessing how the spinoffs might impact firms’ market values. At 
the same time, however, these restructurings are complex, and they may coincide with significant 
changes in firms’ strategies or markets, potentially limiting analysts’ ability to generate useful 
information for investors.  
We use manually collected data from 1,793 analyst reports that were issued around 62 
spinoffs and tracking stock issues to provide detailed empirical evidence about the quantity, type, 
and quality of research performed by analysts. We find that analysts pay relatively little attention 
in their reports to the subsidiaries that will be spun off (measured, for example, by page counts, 
or by whether the reports include explicit forecasts of post-spinoff EPS), even though 
                                                 
24 Even in newly public companies, analysts have a minimum price history of 25 days (or 40, since 2002) as a 
reference, because of the quiet period that has to be observed after any IPO. 
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subsidiaries generally account for an economically significant share of firms’ operations before 
the spinoff––a result we label as “the forgotten child effect.”  
Consistent with this lack of attention to subsidiaries, we find that when analysts do 
provide forecasts of subsidiary EPS, the forecasts are less accurate than corresponding parent 
EPS forecasts. Analysts’ forecasts of post-spinoff stock prices for both parents and subsidiaries 
tend to be less accurate than their EPS forecasts. We show that forecasts of parent EPS are more 
accurate when analysts or their investment banks have more experience covering the firm or its 
industry, and when analysts pay relatively more attention to and provide more detailed 
information about the parent in their reports. Similar cross-sectional variation is not observed in 
the case of subsidiary EPS forecast errors, however. Moreover, we establish that when analysts 
make less accurate forecasts about subsidiaries, they in turn make less accurate forecasts about 
their parents, providing evidence that by forgetting about the child in their reports, analysts also 
neglect the parent companies.  
Finally, we illustrate that both the EPS and price forecast errors in our sample of spinoffs 
exceed forecast errors previously documented in the context of other corporate restructuring 
transactions, such as IPOs, mergers, and bankruptcies. We conclude that the complexity 
associated with forecasting earnings and stock prices in the context of corporate spinoffs, 
combined with analysts’ apparent disregard for subsidiaries in their analysis of corporate 
spinoffs, seem to limit analysts’ ability to add value as information intermediaries in this setting. 
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Table 1. Spinoffs Included in the Sample 
List of spinoffs and tracking stock issues included in a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions announced 
between 1985 and 2000. 
 
Number 
of 
Analyst 
Reports 
Announcement 
Date 
Effective 
Date Parent Company Name Subsidiary Company Name 
     
4 12/2/1992 12/26/1992 Adolph Coors ACX Technologies  
4 8/23/1988 11/30/1988 Ametek  Ketema  
44 7/26/1995 3/27/1996 Anheuser-Busch Earthgrains 
184 9/20/1995 12/31/1996 AT&T  NCR  
7 6/27/1995 1/4/1996 Bally Entertainment  Bally's Health & Tennis 
12 4/27/1992 12/1/1992 Baxter International  Caremark  
104 7/12/1999 3/31/2000 Baxter International  Edwards Lifesciences  
3 4/23/1985 4/10/1986 Borg-Warner  York International 
113 9/28/2000 8/6/2001 Bristol-Myers Squibb Zimmer Holdings1  
25 9/9/1997 3/30/1998 Campbell Soup Vlasic Foods International  
48 7/18/2000 3/30/2001 Ceridian  Arbitron 
10 8/26/1996 12/3/1996 Consolidated Freightways (renamed CNF Transportation) Consolidated Freightways  
5 3/29/1988 10/7/1988 Crane Medusa  
35 1/9/1996 11/1/1996 Dun & Bradstreet  ACNielsen2 
18 1/9/1996 11/1/1996 Dun & Bradstreet  Cognizant2 
25 12/16/1999 10/3/2000 Dun & Bradstreet  Moody's Investors Service 
54 6/15/1993 1/4/1994 Eastman Kodak  Eastman Chemical 
15 6/8/2000 12/1/2000 Fluor (renamed Massey) Fluor 
54 4/14/2000 6/28/2000 Ford Motor Visteon  
9 1/7/1997 7/23/1997 General Instrument  CommScope2 
9 1/7/1997 7/28/1997 General Instrument  NextLevel Systems2 
17 4/25/1985 11/29/1985 General Mills  Crystal Brands2 
35 12/15/1994 5/10/1995 General Mills  Darden Restaurants 
17 4/25/1985 11/29/1985 General Mills  Kenner Parker Toys2 
34 3/4/1999 6/28/1999 Genzyme  Genzyme Surgical Products3 
12 9/17/1997 12/16/1997 Georgia-Pacific  Georgia-PacificTimber3 
12 10/11/1995 1/24/1996 Halliburton Highlands Insurance Group  
2 9/15/1993 12/16/1993 Harcourt General  GC Cos. (General Cinema) 
26 6/30/1998 12/31/1998 Hilton Hotels  Park Place Entertainment  
13 8/24/1989 2/7/1990 Holiday  Promus 
11 4/17/1990 10/3/1990 Honeywell  Alliant Techsystems 
7 8/9/1995 12/26/1995 Host Marriott  Host Marriott Services 
5 8/27/1992 3/8/1993 Humana (renamed Galen Health Care ) Humana  
12 12/8/1993 3/4/1994 ITT  Rayonier  
8 6/15/2000 7/13/2000 Kansas City Southern Industries  Stilwell Financial  
9 6/19/1986 10/27/1986 Kraft  Premark International  
17 6/18/1993 3/17/1994 Litton Industries  Western Atlas 
114 3/1/2000 10/2/2000 Lucent Technologies  Avaya  
7 11/7/1986 4/28/1987 Lucky Stores  Hancock Fabrics 
26 1/17/1996 5/9/1996 May Department Stores Payless ShoeSource  
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Table 1. Spinoffs Included in the Sample (continued) 
 
Number 
of 
Analyst 
Reports 
Announcement 
Date 
Effective 
Date Parent Company Name Subsidiary Company Name 
     
40 11/14/1995 7/1/1996 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) Imation 
21 2/27/1989 7/3/1989 Morton-Thiokol (renamed Thiokol) Morton International 
4 9/5/1996 12/31/1996 Murphy Oil  Deltic Timber 
18 3/9/1999 6/15/1999 Nabisco Group Holdings  RJ Reynolds Tobacco Holdings 
2 9/23/1998 4/27/1999 PE Biosystems Celera Genomics3 
99 1/23/1997 10/7/1997 PepsiCo  Tricon Global Restaurants 
16 11/1/1995 5/31/1996 Premark International  Tupperware 
31 1/30/1995 7/3/1995 Promus Promus Hotel  
56 4/24/1990 7/16/1991 Quaker Oats Fisher-Price  
14 8/16/1993 3/31/1994 Ralston Purina Ralcorp Holdings  
28 6/29/1998 12/31/1998 Rockwell International  Conexant Systems  
28 3/17/1997 10/2/1997 Rockwell International  Meritor Automotive 
14 4/29/1999 11/4/1999 Tenneco  Packaging Corp. of America 
67 9/24/1996 12/10/1997 Thermo Electron  Thermo Vision 
28 12/16/1991 7/6/1992 Union Carbide  Praxair  
12 1/16/1998 6/10/1998 US Office Products Aztec Technology Partners2 
12 1/16/1998 6/10/1998 US Office Products School Specialty2 
27 7/21/1999 3/23/2000 Weatherford International  Grant Prideco  
15 6/23/1997 1/30/1998 Whitman  Hussmann International2 
6 9/18/1987 1/1/1989 Whitman  Illinois Central Transportation 
11 6/23/1997 1/30/1998 Whitman  Midas2 
12 9/28/1990 4/2/1991 Whitman  Pet  
78 11/1/2000 6/7/2001 WorldCom  MCI Group3 
     
 
1 Bristol-Myers Squibb announced its planned divestiture of Zimmer on September 28, 2000. On February 22, 2001, 
it announced that the divestiture would be structured as a tax-free spin-off to shareholders. 
2 Part of a multiple divestiture 
3 Tracking stock issue 
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Table 2. Financial Characteristics of Spinoff Parent and Subsidiary Firms, 1985-2001 
The sample is a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (spinoffs and tracking stock issues) announced 
between 1985 and 2000. All variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year in which each spinoff became 
effective. 
 
 Means Medians 
       
 Parent Subsidiary t-stat. Parent Subsidiary Chi2(1) 
       
Sales ($000) 9,281.6 2,202.4 2.40** 3,692.0 1,189.3 6.34*** 
       
Assets ($000) 12,519.8 1,989.4 2.14** 3,461.6 1,036.1 5.98*** 
       
Debt/Assets 0.299 0.302 -0.07 0.270 0.246 0.67 
       
EBIT/Sales 0.124 0.008 1.30 0.114 0.081 1.89* 
       
CAPEX/Sales 0.074 0.188 -0.92 0.055 0.047 0.91 
       
Market Value ($000) 11,765.5 1,674.6 3.44*** 3,474.6 1,049.3 5.31*** 
       
Tobin’s q 2.035 2.196 -0.51 1.858 1.587 1.53 
       
Number of Unique Companies 52 62 n/a 52 62 n/a 
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Table 3. Information Content of Analyst Reports about Upcoming Spinoffs 
Percentage of reports that provide information about the parent or subsidiary in a spinoff, or about the transaction 
itself. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a 
random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 
2000. 
 
Panel A. Company-Specific Information     
 Parent-Only Information 
Subsidiary-Only 
Information 
   
Price Targets   
   Stock Price 32.7% 38.4% 
   Market Value  4.1% 7.0% 
   
EPS Forecasts   
Parent- or Subsidiary-Only EPS Forecasts 26.3% 19.5% 
Consolidated EPS Forecasts 53.3% n/a 
Both Parent-Only EPS and Consolidated EPS Forecasts 0.9% n/a 
No EPS Forecasts 19.5% 80.5% 
EPS Growth 45.6% 2.7% 
   
PE Forecasts 77.2% 7.8% 
   
Other Profit Forecasts *   
CF or CF/Share 9.1% 0.8% 
Revenue 2.1% 0.8% 
EBITDA or EBITDA/Share 4.0% 3.2% 
EBIT or EBT 1.5% 1.3% 
Net Income 3.0% 0.6% 
ROE 5.5% 0.4% 
TEV/EBITDA 1.8% 0.3% 
Total Other Profit Forecasts 33.0% 8.8% 
   
Financial Statements Forecasts   
   Income Statement 21.4% 7.6% 
   Balance Sheet 6.4% 2.3% 
   Cash Flow Statement 7.2% 2.5% 
   
Valuation Methods **   
PE Multiple 32.1% 10.8% 
Other Multiple 7.7% 8.0% 
DCF 1.4% 1.2% 
   
Avge. Number of Pages Discussing Company or Industry 3.3 0.9 
Avge. Fraction of Total Pages in Report Discussing Company or Industry 0.6 0.1 
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Table 3. Information Content of Analyst Reports about Upcoming Spinoffs (continued) 
 
Panel B. Spinoff-Specific Information    
Percentage of Reports that Discuss or Provide Analysis of:   
   Parent or Subsidiary's Competitors 32.9%  
   Rationale for Spinoff 26.4%  
   Transaction Costs of Spinoff 8.4%  
   Conglomerate Discount 13.3%  
   Allocation of Debt or Overhead 13.8%  
   Business Segment Financial Information 35.4%  
   
Stock Recommendation   
   Buy/Positive 62.0%  
   Sell/Negative 0.8%  
   Hold/Neutral 24.7%  
   None 12.5%  
   
Opinion about Spinoff   
   Positive 34.7%  
   Negative 1.0%  
   Neutral/Mixed 48.7%  
   None 15.6%  
   
Number of Reports 1,793  
Average Number of Reports per Spinoff 28.9  
 Average Number of Reports per Deal 8.5   
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Table 4. Earnings and Price Forecast Accuracy around Spinoffs 
Errors in analyst forecasts of earnings-per-share and stock price. Forecast errors are measured in several alternative 
ways, as indicated in the table. When EPS Forecast Error is measured as the absolute difference between forecasted 
EPS and actual EPS on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price, the parent’s stock price is measured 
at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast period, while the subsidiary’s stock price is measured at the end of 
the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. For Price Forecast Error, stock price is always measured as of the 
forecast date unless otherwise specified. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company 
and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) 
announced between 1985 and 2000. 
 
  Parent Forecast Errors  
Subsidiary 
Forecast Errors 
  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Panel A. EPS Forecast Errors      
1. Absolute Error Relative to Actual Price: | EF – EA | / PA 5.60% 1.30%  7.50% 3.30% 
2. Absolute Error Relative to Actual EPS: | EF – EA | / EA 34.58% 11.30%  51.25% 44.44% 
Number of Reports Containing EPS Forecasts 1,400  263 
       
Panel B. Price Forecast Errors      
1. Absolute Error Relative to Actual Price: | PF – PA | / PA 44.10% 21.10%  47.90% 26.40% 
2. Log of Ratio of Target to Actual Price: Ln (PF / PA) 42.86% 23.50%  42.17% 31.60% 
3. a) If Target Price PF  > Actual Price PA on Report Date:      
       % of Reports where PA ≥ PF  within 12 Months 65.93% n/a  46.08% n/a 
      12-Month Maximum PA Relative to Target Price PF 146.68% 128.16%  127.72% 116.58% 
    b) If Target Price PF  < Actual Price PA on Report Date:      
       % of Reports where PA ≤ PF  within 12 Months 34.07% n/a  53.92% n/a 
      12-Month Minimum PA Relative to Target Price PF 120.29% 112.16%  126.87% 119.05% 
Number of Reports Containing Price Forecasts 587  683 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for key variables. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company 
and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) 
announced between 1985 and 2000. 
 
  Parent-Level Variables  
Subsidiary-Level 
Variables 
  Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
      
Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages 0.607 0.384  0.149 0.246 
Total Report Pages 5.666 7.375  5.666 7.375 
Number of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts 1.632 0.907  0.345 0.772 
Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast 0.327 0.469  0.384 0.486 
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast 0.456 0.498  0.027 0.161 
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast 0.772 0.419  0.078 0.268 
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast 0.330 0.470  0.088 0.283 
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index 0.349 0.729  0.124 0.449 
Spinoff Analysis Index 1.247 1.313  1.247 1.313 
Days from Announcement to Report Date 117.853 102.133  117.853 102.133 
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary) 9.283 1.315  7.375 1.613 
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent 0.455 1.185  0.455 1.185 
Relatedness 0.090 0.287  0.090 0.287 
Analyst Ranking by II 0.934 1.428  0.934 1.428 
Broker Reputation Ranking 3.689 6.941  3.689 6.941 
Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector 0.807 0.395  0.807 0.395 
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector 0.489 0.500  0.489 0.500 
Analyst Advisor 0.173 0.733  0.173 0.733 
Optimistic Spinoff Spin 0.347 0.476  0.347 0.476 
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin 0.010 0.100  0.010 0.100 
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Table 6. Information Content of Analyst Reports and Earnings Forecast Accuracy: 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions of earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast errors on various items of information 
contained in analyst reports. EPS Forecast Error is measured as the absolute difference between forecasted EPS and 
actual EPS on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price: | EF – EA | / PA. For the parent forecast error, 
stock price is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast period. For the subsidiary forecast error, 
stock price is measured at the end of the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. The sample consists of 1,793 
analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing 
transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 2000. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the analyst-level are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 
10% (*) level, respectively.  
 
  
Parent EPS  
Forecast Errors [1]   
Subsidiary EPS  
Forecast Errors [2] 
  Coef. S.E.   Coef. S.E. 
      Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages -0.060** 0.023  0.032 0.024 
Total Report Pages 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.001 
Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast 0.004 0.008  -0.037** 0.017 
Number of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts -0.032*** 0.010  0.010 0.011 
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast -0.021 0.014  0.034 0.042 
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast 0.012 0.015  0.007 0.020 
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast -0.024** 0.011  -0.014 0.020 
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index 0.019*** 0.007  0.017 0.012 
Spinoff Analysis Index -0.007 0.004  0.003 0.006 
Days from Announcement to Report Date -0.000* 0.000  -0.000* 0.000 
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary) 0.011*** 0.004  0.024* 0.014 
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent 0.037*** 0.006  0.000 0.020 
Relatedness -0.068*** 0.023  -0.101 0.064 
Analyst Ranking by II 0.011* 0.006  0.001 0.007 
Broker Reputation Ranking 0.002* 0.001  -0.001 0.002 
Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector -0.022* 0.011  -0.015 0.032 
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector -0.043*** 0.014  0.037* 0.021 
Analyst Advisor -0.016* 0.008  -0.024** 0.011 
Optimistic Spinoff Spin -0.023* 0.012  -0.019 0.012 
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin 0.087 0.074  0.137 0.124 
Constant 0.038 0.040  -0.057 0.102 
      
Observations 1,400  263 
R-squared 0.220  0.551 
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Table 7. Information Content of Analyst Reports and Earnings Forecast Accuracy:  
Analyst Fixed Effects 
Analyst fixed effects regressions of earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast errors on various items of information 
contained in analyst reports. EPS Forecast Error is measured as the absolute difference between forecasted EPS and 
actual EPS on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price: | EF – EA | / PA. For the parent forecast error, 
stock price is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast period. For the subsidiary forecast error, 
stock price is measured at the end of the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. The sample consists of 1,793 
analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing 
transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 2000. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the analyst-level are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 
10% (*) level, respectively.  
 
  Parent EPS Forecast Errors [1]  
Subsidiary EPS 
Forecast Errors [2] 
  Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. 
      
Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages -0.018* 0.010  0.014 0.018 
Total Report Pages 0.000 0.000  -0.001 0.001 
Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast 0.000 0.005  0.046 0.029 
Number of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts -0.020** 0.008  -0.011 0.009 
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast 0.001 0.012  0.054 0.035 
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast 0.015 0.011  -0.008 0.020 
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast 0.006 0.007  0.030 0.021 
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index 0.000 0.006  0.016 0.014 
Spinoff Analysis Index 0.001 0.003  -0.014 0.012 
Days from Announcement to Report Date 0.000** 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary) -0.044* 0.024  0.041 0.059 
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent 0.032** 0.016  -0.022 0.184 
Relatedness -0.126** 0.061  0.000 0.000 
Analyst Ranking by II -0.016 0.013  -0.012 0.029 
Broker Reputation Ranking -0.001 0.002  0.000 0.003 
Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector -0.034 0.029  -0.041 0.066 
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector -0.055 0.041  -0.009 0.115 
Analyst Advisor -0.105* 0.058  0.084 0.116 
Optimistic Spinoff Spin -0.003 0.006  0.012 0.016 
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin -0.030 0.021  -0.038 0.028 
Constant 0.510** 0.236  -0.185 0.324 
      
Observations 1,400  263 
R-squared 0.364  0.172 
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Table 8. Information Content of Analyst Reports and Earnings Forecast Accuracy: 
Heckman Two-Stage Models 
Heckman two-stage regressions of earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast errors on various items of information 
contained in analyst reports. The dependent variable in the first stage is the probability that the analyst report 
contains EPS Forecasts for the parent or subsidiary company (depending on the regression). The dependent variable 
in the second stage is EPS Forecast Error, measured as the absolute difference between forecasted EPS and actual 
EPS on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price: | EF – EA | / PA. For the parent forecast error, stock 
price is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast period. For the subsidiary forecast error, stock 
price is measured at the end of the first fiscal year in which the stock trades. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst 
reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 
spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  Parent EPS Forecast Error [1]  
Subsidiary EPS 
Forecast Error [2] 
 Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 1 Stage 2 
  Pr[Forecast] Error  Pr[Forecast] Error 
Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO -0.034***   0.030***  
 0.010   0.011  
Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages 0.606*** -0.059***  0.159 0.034 
 0.190 0.013  0.249 0.024 
Total Report Pages -0.006 0.001  0.001 0.000 
 0.008 0.001  0.007 0.001 
Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast 0.426*** 0.005  0.632*** -0.020 
 0.144 0.009  0.139 0.022 
No. of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts 1.390*** -0.029***  1.268*** 0.029* 
 0.100 0.009  0.085 0.017 
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast -0.081 -0.021**  -0.044 0.034 
 0.147 0.008  0.281 0.024 
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast 1.230*** 0.017  0.336* 0.013 
 0.164 0.017  0.181 0.018 
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast 0.025 -0.025***  0.282 -0.011 
 0.145 0.009  0.180 0.017 
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index -0.134 0.019***  -0.039 0.017* 
 0.092 0.006  0.113 0.010 
Spinoff Analysis Index 0.037 -0.006*  0.095* 0.004 
 0.058 0.004  0.054 0.006 
Days from Announcement to Report Date 0.001 -0.000*  0.000 -0.000* 
 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.000 
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary) -0.070 0.012***  0.002 0.021*** 
 0.055 0.004  0.055 0.007 
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent -0.380*** 0.036***  0.091 0.007 
 0.065 0.005  0.091 0.013 
Relatedness -0.409 -0.068***  0.107 -0.103*** 
 0.273 0.019  0.317 0.037 
Analyst Ranking by II 0.031 0.011***  -0.035 0.001 
 0.041 0.003  0.045 0.005 
Broker Reputation Ranking 0.041*** 0.002***  0.028*** -0.001 
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 0.008 0.001  0.010 0.001 
Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector 0.280* -0.021*  -0.330* -0.023 
 0.169 0.011  0.170 0.021 
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector -0.046 -0.044***  -0.110 0.033* 
 0.142 0.009  0.142 0.018 
Analyst Advisor 0.058 -0.015**  0.031 -0.024** 
 0.083 0.006  0.108 0.012 
Optimistic Spinoff Spin 0.046 -0.023**  -0.170 -0.020 
 0.139 0.009  0.142 0.015 
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin 5.306 0.089**  0.171 0.142** 
 0.000 0.035  0.570 0.064 
Constant -1.333 0.023  -2.302*** -0.117 
 0.952 0.050  0.534 0.083 
Lambda  0.019   0.044 
  0.028   0.032 
Observations 1,793 1,400  1,793 263 
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Table 9. Impact of Subsidiary Forecast Accuracy on Parent Forecast Accuracy 
Heckman two-stage regressions of earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast errors on various items of information 
contained in analyst reports. The dependent variable in the first stage is the probability that the analyst report 
contains EPS Forecasts for the subsidiary company. The dependent variable in the second stage is Parent EPS 
Forecast Error, measured as the absolute difference between forecasted EPS and actual EPS on the forecast date, 
scaled by the company’s stock price: | EF – EA | / PA.  Stock price is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
forecast period. The sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary 
from a random sample of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 
1985 and 2000. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 
5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. 
  Parent EPS Forecast Error 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 
  Pr[ Subsidiary Forecast] Parent Forecast Error 
Subsidiary IPO / Parent IPO 0.029**  
 0.013  
Subsidiary EPS Forecast Error  0.156** 
  0.070 
Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages -0.417 -0.093*** 
 0.276 0.033 
Total Report Pages 0.009 -0.001 
 0.007 0.001 
Parent or Subsidiary Price Forecast 0.750*** 0.003 
 0.151 0.020 
No. of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts 1.293*** -0.004 
 0.091 0.012 
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast -0.189 -0.006 
 0.346 0.017 
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast 0.066 0.011 
 0.205 0.028 
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast 0.371* -0.003 
 0.200 0.018 
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index -0.220* 0.017* 
 0.134 0.010 
Spinoff Analysis Index 0.141** -0.010 
 0.058 0.008 
Days from Announcement to Report Date -0.001 -0.000* 
 0.001 0.000 
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary) 0.042 -0.012 
 0.068 0.010 
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent 0.015 0.047*** 
 0.105 0.014 
Relatedness 0.318 -0.127*** 
 0.341 0.047 
Analyst Ranking by II -0.024 0.006 
 0.048 0.006 
Broker Reputation Ranking 0.028*** 0.001*** 
 0.011 0.001 
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Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector -0.394** 0.003 
 0.177 0.024 
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector -0.061 -0.065 
 0.152 0.021 
Analyst Advisor 0.032 0.011 
 0.121 0.018 
Optimistic Spinoff Spin -0.280* -0.038** 
 0.156 0.019 
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin 0.422 -0.045 
 0.549 0.063 
Constant -2.623*** 0.164 
 0.613 0.113 
Lambda  -0.007 
  0.020 
Observations 1,714 188 
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Table 10. Information Content of Analyst Reports and Price Forecast Accuracy 
Ordinary Least Squares regressions of price forecast errors on various items of information contained in analyst 
reports. Price Forecast Error is measured as the absolute difference between forecasted (target) stock price and 
actual stock price on the forecast date, scaled by the company’s stock price on the same date: | PF – PA | / PA. The 
sample consists of 1,793 analyst reports covering the parent company and/or the subsidiary from a random sample 
of 62 refocusing transactions (58 spinoffs and 4 tracking stock issues) announced between 1985 and 2000. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) 
level, respectively.  
 
  
Parent Price Forecast 
Errors [1]  
Subsidiary Price 
Forecast Errors [2] 
  Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. 
      Parent or Subsidiary Share of Report Pages 0.061 0.104  0.079 0.112 
Total Report Pages 0.000 0.007  0.000 0.003 
Number of Annual Parent or Subsidiary EPS Forecasts 0.008 0.051  0.012 0.047 
Parent or Subsidiary EPS Growth Forecast -0.112** 0.051  -0.050 0.101 
Parent or Subsidiary PE Forecast -0.291 0.180  -0.054 0.089 
Parent or Subsidiary Other Forecast 0.067 0.069  -0.479*** 0.132 
Parent or Subsidiary Financial Statement Index -0.087 0.084  0.111* 0.066 
Spinoff Analysis Index 0.055** 0.028  -0.036 0.031 
Days from Announcement to Report Date 0.000 0.000  -0.001** 0.000 
Ln(Total Assets of Parent or Subsidiary) -0.109** 0.044  0.023 0.025 
Total Assets of Subsidiary / Total Assets of Parent -0.033 0.069  0.049 0.055 
Relatedness 0.089 0.392  -0.118 0.132 
Analyst Ranking by II -0.051** 0.023  0.019 0.025 
Broker Reputation Ranking 0.005 0.004  0.007 0.005 
Analyst Provides 10%+ of Broker’s Reports in Sector 0.125 0.085  0.009 0.099 
Broker Provides 2%+ of Reports in Sector -0.095 0.076  -0.007 0.073 
Analyst Advisor -0.050 0.046  -0.059 0.057 
Optimistic Spinoff Spin 0.001 0.072  -0.024 0.070 
Pessimistic Spinoff Spin -0.282 0.182  0.557 0.677 
Constant 1.220*** 0.350  0.296 0.200 
      
Observations 587 683 
R-squared 0.203 0.333 
            
 
 
 
 
 
